The supply chain for integrated circuits typically includes a design stage, a manufacturing stage, a distribution stage, and field usage stage. In the design stage, circuit developers can utilize a “design flow” to develop a circuit design representing an electronic device. The particular steps of the design flow often are dependent upon a type of electronic device to be manufactured, its complexity, the design team, and a fabricator or foundry that will manufacture integrated circuits implementing the electronic device. Typically, these circuit developers utilize software and hardware “tools” to help develop and verify the circuit design at various stages of the design flow. The circuit design at the end of the design stage is often specified as a pattern layout design, for example, in a Graphic Database System II (GSDII) format or Open Artwork System Interchange Standard (OASIS) format.
In the manufacturing stage, a fabricator or foundry can manufacture integrated circuit chips that implement the electronic device described in the circuit design. Since many circuit developers utilize third-party fabricators or foundries to manufacture integrated circuit chips implementing the electronic device described in their circuit designs, the lack of direct control over the manufacturing of the chips can lead to various manufacturing-related vulnerabilities, such as unauthorized alteration of the circuit designs, unauthorized reuse or dissemination of circuit designs, unauthorized (over)production of chips implementing the circuit designs, or the like. Some circuit developers attempt to combat these manufacturing-related vulnerabilities by maintaining a physical presence, i.e., stationing personnel, at the manufacturing facility, retrieving masks after production, impose reporting constraints on manufacturers on scrapping wafers, etc. While these attempts can reduce some of the manufacturing-related vulnerabilities, it is often impractical for many circuit developers due to cost and required cooperation by the fabricators. Instead, these circuit developers rely on a subjective level of trust with these third-party fabricators or foundries to ensure that the circuit designs are adequately secured and that unauthorized or counterfeit copies of the chips are not manufactured or distributed.
In the distribution stage, the manufactured integrated circuit chips can be provided to customers for inclusion in their products by distributors. These distributors, however, are typically third-parties, which can also lend itself to other vulnerabilities, such as distribution channel piracy. For example, third-party distributors sometimes sell cheaper parts mislabeled or re-labeled as premium parts. Even though some circuit developers contractually retain distribution rights for their chips or systems, third-party distributors have been known to resell old chips, for example, by unsoldering them from a prior system and then reselling them as new or even as an updated model, and thus failing to abide by their contractual obligations.
Most circuit developers attempt to combat distribution channel piracy by having their manufacturers mark the integrated circuit chips or their associated packaging with some physical indicia, e.g., with DNA paint, with holographic stickers, through laser etching, or the like, which allows both the circuit developers and their customers to assume authenticity of the integrated circuit chips.